Session 5 · 6 October 2026
Should governments be able to access encrypted messages to fight crime?
5 min read · 2 positions · 4 cited sources · Session recording
Neither team argued that the police should never read a criminal’s messages, and neither argued that governments should read everyone’s. Both accepted the warrant: a judge, a suspect, a search. The disagreement was over everything before that point — whether governments should be able to look for crime in encrypted chats before anyone is suspected.
The debate turned on EncroChat. Angelo used it to show what access can achieve; Sonal used the same case to argue that the police got in because they already suspected the network, which is the warrant system working rather than a reason to replace it. From there the For team’s case rested on automation keeping ordinary chats private, and the Against team’s on the fact that any system able to flag messages is one a government can misuse.
The For team argued three against two. Dwij filmed and moderated. Every argument above was made in Room 213; the sources were found afterwards to check the claims the debaters made.
Sides in this debate were assigned, not chosen. Neither position below should be read as any debater's personal view. Our standards.
For the motion
Encryption hides crimes as they happen, and targeted, automated access can catch them without anyone reading ordinary chats.
Angelo opened the For case with the crimes encryption hides. Many serious crimes, especially against children, happen live, and once they move onto end-to-end encrypted apps such as WhatsApp or Signal, nobody — not the platform, not the police — can see abuse material being shared. Victims, and the lawyers who take on their cases, are left with no way of knowing what happened. Governments, he argued, need some way to see when harm is taking place.
His strongest example was EncroChat, an encrypted phone network used by organised crime. In 2020 French and Dutch police got into it, and by 2023 the operation had led to more than 6,500 arrests and the seizure of over a hundred tonnes of cocaine and more than 900 weapons. Imagine, Angelo said, if the police had not been allowed in: none of those arrests or seizures would have happened.
The For team's answer to the privacy objection was that access would not mean people sitting at desks reading messages. Novak pointed out that with eight billion people, nobody could monitor every text; Angelo argued that access would work through automated checks that look only for flagged keywords and known illegal content, and that only near-certain matches would go further. He pointed to on-device scanning as a model: checking photos on the phone itself against known abuse images, without sending them to the company. (Apple designed a system like this in 2021, but dropped it in 2022 after privacy objections, so it is not running on phones today.)
Novak's main argument was that this is how searches already work. The police can search your house, your car and your bank account if a judge signs a warrant, and a judge can refuse. Messages could follow the same rules, and messaging companies could build their own safeguards so that governments only ever see flagged messages. Kartikeya added that even when an alert does not lead to an arrest, it matters that the government knows about a threat, so it can act quickly if something happens.
When the Against team warned that governments misuse power, Angelo argued that the places where that happens are few, and that in most countries people would push back and shut such a system down if it were abused. He also asked whether privacy really matters more than safety, pointing to crimes like cyberbullying and grooming that go unnoticed in private chats; even if criminals moved elsewhere, adding friction would still stop some crimes. Kartikeya's closing summed up the case: if we accept that police can search a house with a warrant, we can accept the same rules online. Privacy should protect people, not guarantee that serious crime goes uninvestigated.
Sources (2)
Against the motion
Police can already get a warrant for suspects; reading everyone else's messages adds little evidence and a great deal of risk.
Sonal opened by asking what access is actually for. The government wants messages as evidence of a crime, and when someone is suspected, the police can already get a warrant to search that person. There is no point, she argued, in reading everyone's messages before any crime has happened. When Angelo raised EncroChat, Sonal asked how the police got in — and when the answer was that they suspected the network, her reply was that this is exactly the point: they acted on suspicion. Aayan added that a giant criminal network is a different case from the everyday messages of ordinary people, and that victims of a live crime can call the police themselves.
Their second argument was that mass access would not work. Online, especially when people think they are anonymous, they say things as jokes; take everything literally and there would be a flood of false leads and wrongful arrests, wasting time police need for real crimes. When the For team said the checks would be automated, Sonal answered that automated systems make mistakes, and Aayan that even flagged messages across whole countries would be far more than a limited police force could handle. And a message on its own, Sonal argued, is not concrete evidence of a crime.
They also argued that criminals would simply move. If people knew WhatsApp let the government read their messages, would anyone say anything dangerous there? Sonal argued that access would add a little friction for criminals and catch only a small number of crimes. Aayan listed where they would go: other encryption that is harder to crack, coded language, or meeting and talking in person. The only people left being watched would be ordinary citizens.
Their deepest objection was the government itself. Sonal argued that governments that gain surveillance powers in the name of order have turned them on their own people, watching for anyone who criticises them. That is not hypothetical: in Turkmenistan, the security services monitor phone and online communications, and people who criticise the government on social media face intimidation and prison. When Novak argued that people would just be more careful, Sonal answered that being careful about what you say is the end of free speech. Aayan asked who would check on governments that misuse the power, since in the end the government monitors the government, and pointed out that most people value their privacy: in a 2025 survey commissioned by the encrypted-email company Proton, 76% of Americans said end-to-end encryption mattered when choosing online services.
In closing, Sonal argued that warrants already let governments reach a suspect's messages once a crime has happened, so giving them wider access adds little evidence while risking abuse of power, privacy and freedom of speech. As Aayan put it: no one would feel safe.
Sources (2)
- 76% of Americans value encryption but misunderstand it — Proton, 2025 (survey commissioned by an encryption company)
- Turkmenistan: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report — Freedom House, 2024
Who argued which side
For the motion
Angelo, Novak, Kartikeya
Against the motion
Sonal, Aayan
Most Valuable Debater, scored on the rubric from the recording: Angelo
Credits
| Name | Role |
|---|---|
| Dwij | Moderator |
CAS learning outcomes
This piece is evidence toward:
- LO5 Demonstrate the skills and recognise the benefits of working collaboratively.
- LO6 Demonstrate engagement with issues of global significance.